INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been, and continues to be, shaped in its agreements and institutional foci in significant part by political pressures emanating from its members, particularly those able to wield the most influence. Rather than being an institution with the singular focus of achieving free trade among all members, the WTO comprises a complex set of agreements, many of which represent a politically driven compromise among members as to how to manage trade rather than to liberalize it.' Although the state of WTO liberalization reflects positions agreed to in part as a result of political realities, the reach of politics is more significant in the context of bilateral trade negotiations. Indeed, what members cannot accomplish through the WTO they may try to achieve through free trade agreements (FTAs), particularly with politically or economically weaker trade partners. In the case of the United States, FTAs have been used as an opportunity to impose provisions favored by domestic constituents -such as strengthened intellectual property provisions and labor and environment clauses -that it has not been able to get WTO members to agree to collectively in the multilateral forum. A similar phenomenon has occurred with respect to the European Union (EU) 1 See, e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, "Reciprocity, Non-Discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5932 (1997), at 1 (noting that the CATI establishes goals of reciprocity and nondiscrimination, but not of free trade).
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and its FTA partners. 2 For countries with less bargaining power, the WfO's multilateral setting provides some buffer from power politics3 in the form of the consensus decision-making practice4 and the disproportionate number of developing and least-developed countries. Countries with limited bargaining power will often find themselves in a relatively more vulnerable position in the bilateral or even plurilateral context.5 For poorer countries, this may translate into giving significant concessions in FT A negotiations out of concern that aid or other preferential treatment will be withdrawn. 6 In critiquing FT As as a negative for the multilateral trading system, commentators have addressed numerous issues, including the potential for such agreements to be more trade diverting than trade creating;7 that FTA negotiations necessarily detract resources and attention from multilateral negotiations; 8 that the plethora of regional arrangements is undermining the most-favored nation (MFN) principle;9 and arguments that particular agreements have unfortunate 2 Harpaz, "When East Meets West: Approximation of Laws in the EU-Mediterranean Context,"
43 Common Market L. Rev. (2oo6) 993, at 999 (discussing the expectation by the EU that in connection with its European Neighbourhood Policy, its Mediterranean neighbors will unilaterally "approximate" or align their legislation to some degree to that of the EU rather than having the parties engage in a cooperative process of give and take). 3 See Matteo and Wunsch-Vincent, "Pre-empting Protectionism in Services: The GATS and Outsourcing," 7 f. lnt'l Econ. L. (2004) 765, at 787 ("in a world of unequal bargaining power, multilaterally agreed formulae ... are likely to produce a more favourable outcome for the weaker party than bilateral negotiations."). 4 See Abbott, "A New Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is Bilateralism a Threat?," 10 f. Int'l Econ. L. (2oo7) 571, at 583 (arguing that "weaker actors have a better chance to have their voices heard, and their policy choices taken into account" in the multilateral consensus-based system). 5 See, e.g., Hirsch, "The Sociology oflnternational Economic Law: Sociological Analysis of the Regulation of Regional Agreements in the World Trading System," 19 Eur f. lnt'l L. (2oo8) 277, at 295-296 (identifying the social conflict conception of international economic law as disfavoring IT As because developing states will achieve better outcomes through the collective action of the WTO than through FTA negotiations that will reflect the power asymmetries between the parties). Bagwell and Staiger conclude that ITAs prevent the implementation of an efficient multilateral agreement based on the GATT pillars of nondiscrimination and reciprocity. See Bagwell and Staiger, "An Economic Theory of GATT," Wisconsin MadisonSocial Systems Working Paper 15 (June 1998), at 33· 6 For example, as will be subsequently discussed, the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) countries signed the PACER agreement with Australia and New Zealand in part out offear that the latter would terminate the agreement known as SPARTECA, pursuant to which the PIF countries receive largely duty-free access to the Australian and New Zealand markets and do not have to provide preferential market access in return.
terms such as TRIPS-plus provisions (where TRIPS stands for the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). To these critiques this chapter adds an additional reason to disfavor FTAs by arguing that FTAs can have a further negative effect of constraining the future policy choices of countries that are not party to the original FT As and therefore did not have the opportunity to negotiate or bargain with respect to terms that later end up having spillover effects on these nonparties. This chapter argues that in addition to the direct impacts of political pressure the weaker party to an FTA experiences in the form of "take it or leave it" terms, those terms can also cause additional difficulties in an indirect way, including those for nonparties to the agreement, by effectively constraining policy choices outside the context of the original FT A. In this context "weaker· members"' 0 can include developed countries as well when their FTA partners are more powerfu1, 11 as is the case with Australia relative to the United States and to some degree New Zealand relative to Australia.'' This chapter uses examples from Oceania to illustrate the negative externalities that earlier-negotiated FTAs can have on nonparties to those agreements. Using two specific regional examples as illustrations, the chapter argues that, as 10 In this chapter the term "weak" is used to describe countries with relatively less bargaining power in trade negotiations than the countries with which they are negotiating, and "strong" or "powerful" is used to describe countries with relatively more bargaining power. generally as being a bad deal for Australia. Andrew Mitchell put it bluntly:
The AUSFTA provides an illustration of the outcomes that countries with relatively little bargaining and economic power can expect from an FTA with the US. It also serves as a warning of how even an economically successful developed country may end up sacrificing its welfare, public policies, and democratic processes in a dogged pursuit to cement relations with the United States, in a manner that would be unlikely in the vigorous negotiating environment of the Wf0.24
One might dismiss such criticisms on the basis that Australia was aware of its limited bargaining power and nonetheless determined that it was worthwhile to enter into an ITA with the United States, even though it had to accept certain terms it did not like. Although this may be the case, this chapter focuses on a separate point: that Australia's decision to accept the U.S.'s terms in the AUSFT A affects not just Australia but also its neighbor across the Tasman. To the extent that the AUSFTA results in higher prices for pharmaceuticals in Australia, for example, New Zealanders' access to affordable pharmaceuticals is also potentially at stake as a result of the relationship between Australia and New Zealand that was established in the Australia-New Zealand CER and its flow-on agreements. In particular, because Australia has committed to certain provisions in the AU SIT A, it wiil seek to have relevant arrangements with New Zealand conform to its existing commitments. New Zealand is thus a victim of path-dependent externalities in the form of regulations Australia has agreed to adopt by virtue of its negotiations with the United States -negotiations in which New Zealand had no opportunity to participate.
A. AUSFTA and Pharmaceuticals Trade
The AU SIT A has the potential to affect Australian pharmaceutical prices in a couple of ways. First, certain TRIPS-plus intellectual property provisions have implications for medicines.
2 5 In particular, relative to TRIPS, the agreement It also prohibits parallel importation.> 6 It additionally contains an "evergreening" notification provision/7 which requires that drug manufacturers be notified of any upcoming generic drug entry into the market, and further requires that approval be denied to such generic drugs when a patent is "claimed" by a manufacturer that has not "consented or acquiesced" to the entry into the market of the generic drug. 28 Although Australia introduced anti-evergreening provisions along with the AUSITA implementing legislation to combat the possibility that this provision would lead to an increase in drug prices, such provisions were strongly criticized by the United States and it remains to be seen what would happen if a dispute arose over the · operation of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.
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In addition to the TRIPS-plus provisions, the AUSITA requires regulatory dialogue between the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the Australian Therapeutic Goods Association to speed up approvals of "innovative" medical products and emphasizes a linkage between innovation and highquality health care.3° Pursuant to AUSFTA, Australia had to make changes to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, including adding a review procedure of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) drug-listing rejections.3' Although no changes were directly required to Australia's system of reference pricing, the United States had as a negotiating goal that that system be dismantledY Because of this, concerns have been raised that the combination of the various requirements will ultimately force Australia to abandon this cost-effective measure of setting drug prices. 9 Faunce et al., "Trans-Tasman," supra note 23, at 371-372. In the event a dispute were to arise, Faunce argues that to the extent the AUSFTA is textually ambiguous, Australia could rely on the anti-evergreening amendments as evidence of its expectation that Art. 17.10.4 would not lead to higher pharmaceutical prices under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. See ibid. for a discussion of the merits of the potential legal arguments that could be raised. 3° AUSFTA Annex 2C(1), 2C(4). 3 It was formed with the belief that agreeing to joint procedures and practices would reduce transaction costs and enhance economic growth for both economies. Although there is often an expectation that the unified practice will more strongly resemble whatever Australia's system has been, rather than New Zealand's,4 1 New Zealand presumably has been willing to accept this bias in the instances where it has signed on to specific harmonization measures, in part because of the similarities between Australia and New Zealand's regulatory approaches. However, New Zealand would have made its decisions based on Australia's regulatory standards and procedures at the time. New Zealand likely would not have contemplated that Australia would subsequently significantly alter certain parts of its regulatory framework pursuant to a future ITA, rendering aspects of its regulatory structure significantly different from their previously similar approach. Nevertheless, because of New Zealand's relatively weaker position with respect to Australia -and Australia's relative lack of bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States -Australia accepted the terms of AU SIT A notwithstanding its commitments under ANZCERTA and the implicit assumptions (of similar regulatory approaches) underlying those commitments.
C. AUSFTA Implications for New Zealand
As already noted, Australia and New Zealand have engaged in a range of harmonization efforts as a result of specific CER commitments or more indirectly as a result of the general integration goal of CER. To the ext.ent that Australia has changed or will change certain of its regulatory frameworks pursuant to its obligations under the AUSFT A, New Zealand may find itself under pressure to do the same in the future. The most salient example of this phenomenon lies in the context of the regulation of therapeutic products (comprising medicines, medical devices, and complementary medicines and dietary supplements that have therapeutic uses create harmonized regulations for therapeutic products that would apply to both countries. An eventual ANZTPA has been seen by both countries as "a significant step in the further development of a single economic market. "44 ANZTPA was to have been created by 2oo6, but the New Zealand Labourled government (which was subsequently replaced in 2008 with a Nationalled coalition) did not have the numbers necessary in Parliament to pass a version of the requisite legislation that would satisfy all interested parties.45 In 2007, the project was officially placed on hold.4 6 Nonetheless, the original agreement remains in place and the bill will be revisited once sufficient votes are available.47
In this context, significant concern was voiced in New Zealand that ANZTPA would inherit the heightened intellectual property obligations and pharmaceutical manufacturer protections that the United States imposed on Australia's Therapeutic Goods Authority by means of the AUSFTA. As of this writing, it remains to be seen whether Pharmac and the New Zealand Health Committee's concerns will keep ANZTPA on the back burner indefinitely. Given the support among some members of Parliament, it seems more likely that at some point the legislation will be passed, the treaty signed, and ANZTPA will become a reality. However, in either case, the terms the United States extracted from Australia in the AU SIT A will affect New Zealand. If plans for ANZTPAwere scuttled as a resultoftheAUSFTA, this would mean that New Zealand felt it had to abandon a harmonization effort it otherwise intended to pursue. If, as is more likely, ANZTPA ultimately comes into being, the effects for New Zealand may be more significant, because it might need to adopt the AUSITA standards to effectuate the authority-and see costs increase as a result. The political reality for New Zealand is, unfortunately, that Australia will likely be able to dictate the terms of ANZTPA by virtue of its preexisting commitments under the AUSFTA-commitments to a trading· partner more powerful than New Zealand. This is a concrete example of a negotiation phenomenon that Oona Hathaway has explained in terms of sequencing path dependence: "The power to set the agenda can thus become, in a very real sense, the power to determine the result."5° Thus, in the absence of AUSITA, New Zealand and Australia had similar regulatory approaches to pharmaceuticals and likely could have harmonized their regulatory schemes relatively easily. Now, however, New Zealand finds itself in a very different situation as a result of the spillover effects of the AUSFTA-an agreement to which it is not a party, in which it had no negotiating role, and from which it receives no benefits.
New Zealand may be faced with preordained AUSFTA terms in a different context as well. The United States is currently seeking to join the TransPacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (also known as the P-4 Agreement), which now comprises New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and Brunei DarussalamY Initial negotiations on financial services and investment have already been conducted. Further negotiations, geared toward having the United States join the agreement in its entirety, as well as the additional participation of Australia and Peru, were scheduled to occur in March 2009. These negotiations have been put on hold temporarily while the Obama administration conducts a review of its trade policy and decides which of the various Ff A negotiations initiated by the Bush administration it wishes to continue to pursue. Although these negotiations have therefore been temporarily delayed, it seems likely this is merely procedural and that the Obama administration will decide to resume the negotiations. With the United States already having 5° Hathaway, supra note 17, at 618-619. concluded FfAs with Australia, Peru, Chile, and Singapore, it seems highly likely that the United States will expect New Zealand and Brunei Darussalam to agree to at least some of the measures found in the FTAs the United States has with the other expanded P-4 agreement partnersY The AUSFTA therefore provides an example of an ITA in which the weaker party, Australia, has capitulated to TRIPS-plus provision and other terms that WTO members collectively have successfully resisted incorporating into multilateral trade agreements. This may be a bargained-for exchange in the case of Australia and the gains it sought to obtain under the.AUSFfA, but the bargaining process did not take into account the negative externalities of these terms impacting New Zealand. It is problematic that New Zealand finds itself with unexpected, undesirable regulatory choices as a result of political power being exercised in an agreement it had no role in negotiating.
Although New Zealand may be the victim of path dependence and FTA politics in the case of flow-on effects of the AUSFT A or in the case of the P-4 expansion, it is on the other side of the equation in the role of a "big brother behaving badly"53 in the context of the Pacific region, as is discussed in the following section.
3· PICTA, PACER, AND THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS: PACIFIC ISLANDS NATIONS BETWEEN
A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE Pacific Islands countries have had historical ties to Europe as a result of colonization, and to Australia and New Zealand largely as a result of sheer proximity.54 Many countries in the Pacific are a part of the ACP group of countries (Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific) that comprise former European colonies. The ACP group historically benefited from preferential access to European markets based on the colonial relationships. However, providing preferential access to former colonies to the exclusion of other developing countries was recognized to be a violation of the MFN principle enshrined 5' Rennie, supra note 40, at 71 (noting the path-dependent nature of bilateral FTA provisions whereby terms become a reflection of common practice rather than the particular needs of the parties). In the case of pharmaceuticals protection, the United States has negotiated similar terms to the AUSFTA provisions in its FTA with Korea. 53 See, generally, Kelsey, supra note 20. As a result of the MFN-inconsistent nature of the historical preferences, · the EU sought and successfully received a waiver from the GATT and later the WI'O that permitted it to maintain its preferential treatment of the ACP countries notwithstanding its obligations pursuant to Article I GATI, within the Lome framework. This waiver was extended in 2000, but it ultimately expired in December 2007. As a result, the EU, on the one hand, and the ACP countries, on the other, have had to decide what, if anything, will replace the historical preferences. Without any new agreements, the waiver would expire and the EU would then need to apply its tariff schedules on an MFN basis with respect to the ACP countries. Although other exceptions would apply in certain instances and for certain products by means of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes for developing countries and Europe's Everything but Arms program for least developed countries, this coverage would not be comprehensive. For example, sugar, which is one of Fiji's most important exports and which is currently the subject of a protocol to promote such 55 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Art. !.1. exports,5 8 is not included in the EU's GSP scheme. 59 Rather than broaden its.
GSP scheme coverage to enable the ACP countries to maintain their nonreciprocal market access to the EU, the EU instead proposed that it enter into a series of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the ACP countries (in six regional groups ) 00 to take the place of the waiver. The concept was that the EPAs would satisfy the definition of free trade areas under GATT Article XXIV, 61 and therefore the tariff treatment granted under such agreements would not need to be extended to other WTO members on an MFN basis and would not be subject to waiver approval. Thus the ACP countries would be able to maintain their existing preferential access to the EU market. A difficulty for the ACP countries, however, has been that acceding to the EPAs would require them to provide substantial, comprehensive market access to the EU. Previously, under the waiver, the EU provided preferential market access to the ACP states, but it did not demand reciprocal market access in return. Thus, the ACP countries have been faced with a choice: Should they sacrifice their preferential access to the European Union but maintain their own tariffs on goods originating from its members, or should they instead opt to enter an EPA, thus formalizing their preferential access to the European Union but at the cost of having to provide significant new market access in return? 62 To complicate matters further for Pacific Island countries, once the EU made clear its intention to replace ACP preferences with reciprocal trade arrangements in the form ofEP As, Australia and New Zealand orchestrated the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations, known as PACER, which It is unclear how it came to pass that SPARTECA was able to be notified to the GATT as a partial scope agreement pursuant to the Enabling Clause.7' The Enabling Clause allows for certain arrangements that would not otherwise be permissible under GATT Article XXIV. In particular, the Enabling Clause is the legal basis in the WfO for GSP schemes. It also permits regional arrangements among developing countries, and the Global System of Trade Preferences pursuant to which various developing countries provide reciprocal trade concessions to one another.7 2 However, the Enabling Clause does not permit agreements whereby developed countries give nonreciprocal preferences to subsets of developing countries, outside of the GSP context. This has been precisely the problem with the EC's long-standing preferences granted to the ACP states, and why waivers have been necessary in order for the EC to provide preferential, nonreciprocal treatment to the ACP countries.73
Notwithstanding the scope of the Enabling Clause, however, SPARTECA was notified pursuant to the Enabling Clause even though it involves the developed member countries of Australia and New Zealand providing nonreciprocal preferential market access only to the Pacific Island countries. Unlike the EC's Lome and Cotonou arrangements, there is no apparent expiration 6<) The original members of SPARTECA were Australia, New Zealand, and the members of the South Pacific Forum -the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa. SPARTECA Article XIV.1. 7° The text of SPARTECA may be found at, inter alia, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/ agreements/spartecafta.pdf. 7' "SPARTECA Enabling Clause Preferential Arrangement," GATT Doc. L/5100 (February 20, 1981) . 
C. Pacific Islands in the Balance
The PIF countries now find themselves in a difficult position. Their ACP preferences have expired, leaving them with the choice of negotiating an EPA or relying on alternative sources of preferences. The former is fraught with difficulty-the EPA should ideally be an agreement that is sufficiently comprehensive to satisfy Article XXIV but not so comprehensive as to trigger obligations under PACER. This is a combination that may not be feasible. 8 7 Thus, there is a real risk that if an EPA is entered into, preferential access will also have to be extended to Australia and New Zealand a number of years earlier than it otherwise would. As already noted, Pacific Island countries do not import much from Europe, but they do import significant volumes from Australia and New Zealand. Entering into reciprocal trading arrangements with Australia and New Zealand would entail lowering tariffs on products from these countries, which would have significant consequences for the small local economies. 88 The other option is to decline to negotiate an EPA. On the export side of things, Europe is not a major export market for most · Pacific Island countries; however, they still do not want to lose their preferential access. The EU's GSP scheme does not cover certain important exports for Pacific economies, such as sugar, and it is unlikely it would be willing to dramatically expand its GSP scheme as such preferences have to be offered on a generalized basis to all similarly situated developing countries. The Pacific Island countries have next to no bargaining power when dealing with their stronger regional partners, Australia and New Zealand. Not only are Australia and New Zealand the main export markets for these economies, but they are the source of many imports. Pacific Island nations receive a great deal of their financial assistance from Australia and New Zealand, and many of their citizens attend school or work (or both) in these developed neighboring countries. Thus, although the PIF countries entered into PACER with New Zealand and Australia, this does not mean all parties saw the agreement as equally beneficial. Indeed, the Forum countries felt significant pressure to 8 7 This may not be impossible, however. Whether it is due to poor drafting or intentional design, PACER appears to give some wiggle room to the Forum Island countries to negotiate an agreement with the EU that would not trigger obligations to negotiate with Australia and New Zealand, but only if the EPA covered trade other than goods, i.e., services and investment. Although the EU agreed to begin EPA negotiations within these sectors, it is clear it wants to have goods incorporated into an agreement, whether that be in the form of an EPA or a separate goods arrangement. See Articles 5 and 6 PACER; Kelsey, "Free Trade Agreements- enter into PACER. Although the Forum has proven a useful entity for Pacific Island members in the context of their multilateral trade concerns, it is less helpful in the regional context when it is members of the Forum itselfAustralia and New Zealand-that are pushing difficult decisions.90
4-CONCLUSION
The multilateral trading system provides a better prospect than do FTAs for weaker countries to obtain meaningful trade access to their stronger trading partners' markets.9' Furthermore, weaker countries may be less susceptible to political pressures in the multilateral context where they constitute a majority than in the bilateral or plurilateral setting. Path dependence is also more of a problem in the bilateral-plurilateral context, where "cookie cutter" agreement provisions can easily become default rules. Notwithstanding most WTO members' preference for the multilateral forum, given the uncertain timing and scope for a completed Doha Round, it is likely that the next several years will see members continue to flock to enter into new bilateral and plurilateral arrangements. Developing and developed countries alike, no matter how committed to the WTO in theory, will feel the need to enter into FTAs at a minimum to avoid losing their comparative advantage as their trading competitors pair up with common export target countries.9 2 Unfortunately, as this chapter has shown, the political influence stronger countries can exert in bilateral and plurilateral negotiations not only has direct effects on the weaker parties to the negotiations, but can also have flow-on effects for countries not directly tied to the agreements. Unfavorable provisions arise initially out of the political dominance of stronger negotiating partners such as the United States, the EU, and-relative to the PacificAustralia and New Zealand. Although these provisions are perhaps problematic for the multilateral trading system as they proliferate, in the first instance they 9° Bowman, "The Pacific Island Nations: Towards Shared Representation," in P. Gallagher, P. were accepted by the weaker parties to these trade agreements and thus may seem legitimate. However, as the two examples provided demonstrate, such provisions can have impacts outside the parameters of the original agreement. These negative externalities are not the result of a bargained-for exchange. As FTAs continue to proliferate, we can expect political influence to continue to have ripple effects far beyond the scope of any given agreement. This creates legitimacy concerns, because it is not equitable for FTAs to constrain the policy options of countries that are not party to those agreements, whether through path-dependent externalities of boilerplate provisions or, as demonstrated through the examples of AUSTFA and PACER, through more particularized dynamics existing between trading partners. In contemplating potential reforms to GATT Article XXIV, WTO members should address the fact that political asymmetry in FTA negotiations produces negative externalities on third parties to FTAs, and that these externalities further undermine the legitimacy of such agreements in general.
